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I. INTRODUCTION
Peacekeepers, and peacekeeping, have had a special place in society since
the time of the Bible,' and indeed have taken on a new, international dimension
since the end of World War II and the creation of the United Nations (U.N.). 2
Unfortunately, since the creation of the United Nations peacekeepers (U.N.
peacekeepers) as a reality of international conflict intervention,3 a disparity in
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1. Matthew 5:9 ("Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God.").
2. See MICHAELP. SCHARF, THELAW OFINTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS 1-10 (2001) (describing
the Allies' efforts to create and implement a functional international organization, known as the United
Nations (U.N.), in the wake of their victory in World War If).
3. Id. at 477-524 (outlining the administrative and legal governance of U.N. peacekeepers). See
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how one defines peacekeepers has been created. For laymen, Webster's
Dictionary defines "peacekeeping" as "the preserving of peace."4 For lawyers,
Black's Law Dictionary does not define the term outright, but defines the
concept of "peace" at law as "[a] state of public tranquility; freedom from civil
disturbance or hostility."5 However, for an increasingly visible number of
people living in the areas to which U.N. peacekeepers have been deployed,
peacekeepers are defined in other terms: rapists,6 patrons of prostitutes,7 child
pornographers,' molesters,9 absentee fathers,' ° tormentors," spreaders of
contagion and disease, 2 to name some of the most egregious. Indeed, the U.N.
itself defines the multi-national contingent which it deploys as peacekeepers 3
to trouble spots across the globe not only as humanitarians, but also as "boys,'
'4
using the idea of "[b]oys will be boys"'" to justify supplying the peacekeepers
with pouches of condoms along with their uniforms and official status. 6
also GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF PEACEKEEPERS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1-3 (2004) (describing the recent expansion of the peacekeeping function
of the U.N. in terms of troops and monetary expenditures).
4. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, www.m-w.com/peacekeeping (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1166 8th ed. (2004).
6. See, e.g., Nick Wadhams, UN. Probes Sex Abuse Allegations in Congo, AP ONLINE REGIONAL
-AFRICA, Nov. 11, 2004, available at http://www.ap.org/ (last visited Sept. 30. 2005).
7. See, e.g., 1d.; Leyla Linton, Report: UN. Troops Exploited Congo Girls, AP ONLINE REGIONAL
- AFRICA, Jan. 8, 2005, available at http://www.ap.org/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
8. See Mark Turner, Call to act over sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers, FINANCIAL TIMES
(LONDON), Nov. 18, 2004, at 7.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Thalif Deen, Politics: UN. Battles Sexual Abusers in Congo Peacekeeping, INTER
PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY (IPS), Mar. 25, 2005, available at http://ipsnews.net/index.asp (last visited
Sept. 30, 2005).
11. See Edith M. Lederer, UN. Seeks Police for Congo Peacekeeping, AP ONLINE REGIONAL -
AFRICA (Feb. 2, 2005) (describing the "sexual exploitation" alleged to have occurred at the hands of the U.N.
peacekeepers in the Congo), available at http://www.ap.org/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
12. Brit Hume, Bush Tells Syria To Leave Lebanon, FOx SPECIAL REPORT, Mar. 2, 2005 (Fox News
ran a four-part series on the U.N. peacekeeper abuse allegations.) (hereinafter Fox SPECIAL REPORT).
13. See UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, PEACE AND SECURITY SECTION,
THE SURGE IN U.N. PEACEKEEPING: UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING (2005) (detailing the rise in U.N.
peacekeeping activities and the member states which participate in the multi-national peacekeeping forces),
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpkodpko/pub/exhibition (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
14. Colurn Lynch, UN. Faces More Accusations of Sexual Mlisconduct; Officials Acknowledge
'Swamp'of Problems and Pledge Fixes Amid New Allegations in Africa, Haiti, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2005,
at A22 (describing a U.N. official in Cambodia's response to sexual abuse allegations in Cambodia in 1990
as "[b]oys will be boys").
15. Id.
16. Tobias Kuhlmann, Educating Peacekeepers about AIDS, U.N. CHRONICLE - ONLINE EDITION,
Mar. 1, 2004 (explaining the condom distribution under the logic of "[w]ith many of them [peacekeepers]
Harrington
On a basic humanitarian level, the above should shock readers of any
nationality and profession. To lawyers, however, especially those concerned
with international law, the above should serve as a wake-up call for the need to
change the legal parameters of multi-national peacekeeping. American lawyers
should be particularly concerned with U.N. peacekeeper abuses because of the
role of the United States in creating the U.N., 7 and the close ties between the
largely United States (U.S.) written U.N. Charter 8 and the current, inferential
concept of the acceptability of peacekeeping which has grown out of it.
The goal of this paper is not merely to critique the U.N. and its handling
of the current peacekeeper abuse allegations, as such a critique would only serve
half of the problem. Rather, this paper will use the past and current
understandings of the U.N. Charter, peacekeeping, international law, and
military justice to suggest several options for handling both the current
allegations facing U.N. peacekeepers, especially those in the Congo, and for a
fundamental change in the peacekeeping mission, apparatus, and law in the
future.
Part II of this paper will examine the origins of the concept of peace-
keeping. It will go beyond the current and past concepts of U.N. peacekeeping
to explore the plain language of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and the way
in which it was originally interpreted-namely to substantiate a standing U.N.
military force and centralized command with no mention of peacekeeping
activities per se.
Part III will discuss the current allegations against U.N. peacekeepers in the
Congo and elsewhere, as well as the vague allusions to decades of peacekeeper
abuse found in sources from across the world and the political spectrum. Also
included in this Part is the U.N. reaction to the allegations and the above
mentioned condom distribution system in effect for U.N. peacekeepers. Finally,
this Part will discuss the spread of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
through U.N. peacekeepers and the lax testing requirements in place for
peacekeepers both before and during their active duty.
Part IV will discuss the current laws in effect regarding peacekeepers.
Perhaps the simplest part of the inquiry, this discussion will illustrate that U.N.
peacekeepers are essentially shrouded in protection from their home countries.
The iniquity of this system will be examined, looking at the inequality of
military justice available against peacekeepers based on their country of origin.
young and sexually active, often deployed to or from regions with high HIV/AIDS prevalence, and by
profession inclined to risky behavior, some consider the peacekeepers to be 'more likely to contract or
transmit the virus than the average population"), available at
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2004/issue1/0104p55.asp (last visited Sept. 30. 2005).
17. See SCHARF, supra note 2, at 1-10.
18. Id.
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Part IV will then examine the current International Criminal Court (ICC) statute
and discuss why the extension of the ICC crimes and procedures to
peacekeepers would not be an effective way to ensure either prosecution of
peacekeepers for individual abuses or eligibility for prosecution at all. To set
the framework for the discussion in Part VI, this Part will also include a basic
outline of the sanction power possessed by the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC).
In contrast to the legal morass presented in Part IV, Part V will describe the
current status of the United States Code of Military Justice (USCMJ) and what
prosecutions of peacekeepers would be allowed under it. A comparison of the
procedural aspects of a prosecution under the USCMJ and the ICC statute
provisions will be made as well.
The culmination of this paper is Part VI, in which the author presents
several possible options for addressing the current U.N. peacekeeper abuse
allegations and for changing peacekeeping in the future. It is the author's belief
that, in light of past attitudes of U.N. officials towards peacekeeper abuse
allegations and the current spate of corruption allegations plaguing the U.N. and
its administration, the U.N. is an inappropriate organization to handle the
peacekeeper abuses. To deal with the immediate allegations, the author
recommends that the UNSC direct (and send trusted representatives to oversee)
the creation of secure peacekeeper compounds, as well as promulgate rules
creating new positions of overseers of peacekeepers who are representatives
from at least two of the five permanent UNSC members based on their relative
contribution. The author's reasoning for this suggestion, outside of the basic
sense of responsibility for the U.N. forces which is imparted to the permanent
members of the UNSC under the U.N. Charter, is her very strong belief that
U.S. taxpayers, who are protected by concrete laws regarding such crimes as
rape and molestation, would not want their money to go towards the further
subsidization of peacekeepers who can prey on victims without a guaranteed
recourse. In addition, the author highly advocates the use of economic sanctions
against any countries which have contributed peacekeepers implicated in the
abuse and have failed to prosecute, or failed to vigorously prosecute, those
implicated peacekeepers. These sanctions should be followed up by removal
of the home countries' currently stationed peacekeepers, and blacklisting of
these countries from future peacekeeping missions, if vigorous criminal
prosecution of the errant peacekeepers is not made by the home countries.
To address the future of peacekeeping, the author then proposes a reading
of the Chapter VI provisions of the Charter closer to the original interpretation
that these provisions evince the intent to create a military apparatus attached to
the UNSC and under its ultimate control and authority. This reading would
allow for the creation of a separate, standing military and peacekeeping force
which would be under the joint command of at least two of the five permanent
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UNSC members. While this in and of itself is not a new idea, the author then
proposes that the recruitment and staffing of this force would not come from
voluntary participation by U.N. member countries, but rather from international
recruitment similar to that used by the American military. In this way, the
peacekeepers would be under the control and law of the force itself and not their
home countries. Given the many problems with the ICC statute as applied to at
least the current peacekeeper abuses, the author would further propose that the
most compatible military laws of the five permanent members (in all likelihood
the U.S. and the United Kingdom (U.K.)) be used and applied to the peace-
keepers in this force.
The conclusion of this paper, Part VII, restates the problems and sugges-
tions discussed and offered throughout the paper. It also expresses the author's
belief that peacekeeping as a concept offers many benefits, but that these
benefits are outweighed by any types of abuses. The problem of the U.N.
peacekeepers illustrates that international law is flawed in its attempts to create
legal consensus throughout the world, with the ultimate result being that
peacekeepers who prey on those they are assigned to protect are not subject to
the same justice. In this situation, it is imperative that the countries which
founded the U.N., particularly the U.S., provide structure to the peacekeepers.
Lawyers facing conflicts of law issues will ultimately always have to choose
one law over the other; if this works for commercial transactions then it should
certainly work for the protection of people.
II. CHAPTER VI AND PEACEKEEPING HISTORY
The primary mandate of the U.N. is set out in Chapters V and VII of the
Charter.19 These provisions make it the stated aim of the UNSC to "maint[ain]
international peace and security,"2 and to take action when there are perceived
threats to international peace and/or security.2" A great deal of scholarly work
has focused on when a threat would rise to the level of endangering either
international peace and/or security, but, in recent years at least, there has not
been as much focus on the military provisions of the Charter set out in Chapter
VII.
22
19. U.N. CHARTER chs. V, VII.
20. Id. art. 24.
21. Id. ch. VII.
22. Id.; The author posits that this dearth of literature is due to the documented trend of interpreting
the Chapter V11 provisions as solely authorizing peacekeeping activities through inferential and, it has been
argued, practical readings of the Charter. See generally ERIUA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY CouNcIL (STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW) (2004). Concededly, part of the
reason for the inability to enforce the literal Chapter VII provisions stemmed from the Cold War. Id.
However, it is interesting to note that in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold
2005]
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These provisions are the backbone of the inference that there should be a
U.N. peacekeeping force established and maintained by the UNSC, however this
is only an inference.23  A literal reading of the plain language of the Charter
leads one to believe that the goal of the framers of the U.N. Charter (which is
to say the framers of the U.N. itself) was to create a standing military body,24
under joint command,2" to serve at the ready if necessary to protect that stated
mission of the U.N.26 On the heels of World War II, the victorious powers had
seen their share of war and destruction,2 7 and certainly peacekeeping and
stabilization in the wake of war as well, yet the only literal provisions in the
Charter are for the standing military idea.28 Unfortunately, there are no
interpretative aids for divining the intent of the drafters of the U.N. Charter with
regard to these provisions, however it is not a stretch of the imagination to
suggest that the intent was to create a standing military which would provide a
War there was no push to re-evaluate the understanding and application of Chapter VII, rather, there has been
a push towards more peacekeeping activity and missions in the years since the end of the Cold War. Id.; see
also UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, TIMELINE OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING 1948-2005 (documenting a dramatic increase in the number of peacekeeping operations
undertaken by the U.N. from the mid-1980s/early 1990s onward),
http://www.un.orgDepts/dpko/dpko/timeline/pages/timeline.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2005); Peacekeeping
Resurgence, U.N. CHRONICLE, Mar. 22, 2000.
23. See DE WET, supra note 22 (charting the growth and development of the peacekeeping concept
out of inferences in the Chapter VII provisions); UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS, Q&A -MEETING NEW CHALLENGES, WHAT IS PEACEKEEPING (stating that the basis for the
power to establish and implement peacekeeping operations through the U.N. is because "ft]he Charter of the
United Nations gives the UN Security Council the power and responsibility to take collective action to
maintain international peace and security"), http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q I.htm (last visited Apr.
22, 2005); Fifty Unforeseen Years, U.N. CHRONICLE - ONLINE EDITION, Sept. 22, 1998 (admitting that the
U.N. Charter does not explicitly call for peacekeeping operations and positing that "[t]he Security Council
presumably paused for detailed deliberation when, in 1948, it established the first peacekeeping mission,
which built on the intent, if not the letter, of its assigned responsibility"), available at
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/1998/issue3/398p39.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 47 ("There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and
assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the
maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its
disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament."). This works in conjunction with the article
43 provisions requiring that the members of the UNSC provide military forces and other resources to the
UNSC for the international peace and security mission. Id. art. 43.
25. Id. art. 47 ("The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent
members of the Security Counsel or their representatives.").
26. Id. ("The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the
strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council.").
27. See generally JOSEPH E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL (1994) (providing details
of the horrors inflicted on the world by the Nazis who were tried at the Nuremberg tribunal).
28. U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
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host of services to the U.N. and the world population as a whole,29 as a standard
national military would do. Using this interpretation, peacekeeping would not
need to be elaborated or inferred because it is part of standard military
procedure;3° the corollary to this is that there is no elaboration of a separate
peacekeeping force, implying that all services were to be under the auspices of
a joint command that was to be associated with the UNSC.3"
Regardless of how one interprets the actual language of the U.N. Charter
provisions, once the Cold War started it was accepted that the concept of a
standing military force under a joint command would not be feasible. 2 In this
climate, the U.N. Charter provisions were re-examined, and found to infer the
idea of a peacekeeping mandate which would grow to become the current U.N.
peacekeeping force,33 also known colloquially as the "blue helmets" due to the
color of the uniforms used. 4
At present, there are 67,392 deployed peacekeepers from 103 countries
stationed in various political and military hot spots throughout the world.35
When conceptualizing the makeup of this peacekeeping force many, including
the author, initially assume that there is some form of obligation on the part of
U.N. members to provide troops and personnel to serve as peacekeepers. In
truth, however, the provision of troops and personnel is entirely voluntary on
the U.N. member countries, 36 which are compensated by the U.N. for these
29. Id. ch. V (providing the UNSC, and particularly the permanent members of the UNSC with the
onerous task of the "maintenance of international peace and security'); Id. ch. I (listing, among the methods
for maintaining international peace and security, "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace").
30. For example, part of the current U.S. mission in Iraq is to keep the peace and rebuild the country,
however there are no specified "peacekeepers" tasked to this purpose; rather, the military itself embraces these
responsibilities as part of its standard protocol and mission.
31. At law, there are many methods for the interpretation of statutes, depending on the context and
the question. Many of these are based on U.S. law and tradition, and therefore would be potentially
problematic to use when attempting to interpret the U.N. Charter. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIAL ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 818 (3d ed. 2001).
However, using a textual cannon not based in these laws and traditions does not present the same conflict.
Therefore, the author bases the analysis of the Chapter VII provisions on the interpretative cannon ofexpressio
unis, meaning that "the enumeration of certain things in a statute suggests that the legislature had no intent
of including things not listed or embraced." Id. at 824.
32. See DE WET, supra note 22.
33. Id.
34. See Wadhams, supra note 6.
35. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, ONGOING PEACEKEEPING
MISSIONS SINCE 1948, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
36. See Linton, supra note 7.
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troops and services.37 A persistent problem for U.N. members which provide
troops and services is recouping payment for these provisions." The troops
provided are military personnel within their home countries and, as will be
discussed further in Part IV, are subject to the jurisdiction of their home
countries for prosecution should the event occur.
39
Over the course of their history, U.N. peacekeepers have served in every
conceivable situation, and indeed many have lost their lives in the course of
peacekeeping activities.4 ° In the spirit of these activities, the U.N. peacekeepers
were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988,"' and are honored by the U.N.
with a yearly ceremonial day of recognition and commendation.42 Perhaps this
is the most disturbing contrast given the current abuse allegations, as various
sources have reported that U.N. peacekeepers have been implicated in sexual
abuse scandals and activities since their inception.43 As with the composition
of the peacekeeper missions themselves, these abuse allegations are a truly
global phenomenon, with new and old allegations coming from Cambodia to the
Congo to Haiti to name only a few.44 Indeed, in 2004, only months before the
37. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, Q & A - How ARE
PEACEKEEPERS COMPENSATED?, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q7.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
38. Id. (explaining some instances in which compensation for volunteering peacekeepers has been
withheld, and the financial hardships developing countries face when they provide volunteer peacekeepers
to the U.N. and are compensated afterwards).
39. See Linton, supra note 7; Deen, supra note 10 (citing the U.N.'s own report--"[t]here is a...
presumption that peacekeeping personnel who commit acts of sexual exploitation and abuse that constitute
crimes under generally accepted standards (for example rape or sexual relations with young children) are not
normally subjected to criminal prosecution, whether it be by court martial or by trial before a national criminal
court, which would have been the inevitable result has they committed such acts in their home countries.").
40. Examples ofpeacekeeper deaths in action are spread throughout the course of missions over the
last 50 plus years. For detailed statistics, see UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS,
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING-FATALITIES, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities (last visited Apr. 22,
2005). For recent incidents of peacekeeper deaths in action, see DRC president condemns killing of UN
peacekeepers, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 26, 2005 (stating that nine peacekeepers were killed
in an ambush attack in the Congo).
41. 1988: UN Peacekeeping Forces: 'The Imperial Soldiers '(Nobel Prize), U.N. CHRONICLE, Sept.
1,2003.
42. UN Peacekeeping Missions: Best Way of Ensuring Sustainable Peace, M2 PRESSWiRE, May
25, 2004.
43. See Linton, supra note 7 ("Charges of sex abuse and other crimes have been lodged against U.N.
peacekeeping missions around the world for decades. Officials have found it difficult to crack down because
the United Nations doesn't want to offend the relatively small number of countries that are willing to provide
peacekeepers.").
44. Victoria Engstrand-Neascu, News Feature: Predators in Congo sometimes wear uniforms,
DEUTSCHE-PRESS AGENTUR, Jan. 11,2005; Joseph Loconte, The UN. Sex Scandal, THE WEEKLY STANDARD,
Jan. 3, 2005 (citing a history of allegations ofpeacekeeper abuse in Kosovo, Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone
as well as the Congo); Peter Moszynski, NGOs in Sex for Food Scandal, NEW AFRICAN, Apr. 1, 2002
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first Congo abuse stories started to surface, there was a public admission by a
U.N. official that there were sexual abuses by peacekeepers assigned to the
border area of Ethiopia and Eritrea.45
Thus, the history of the U.N. peacekeepers is one of questionable
interpretation and activities as well as humanitarian awards and missions. What
is most bothersome to this author is that the history of the peacekeepers has such
a pronounced dichotomy between saving people and countries and acting as
criminals. No matter how the U.N. Charter provisions are interpreted, the word-
ing evinces the idea that some kind of security force was necessary to protect
the world from the ravages of war and human atrocities, and indeed many
peacekeepers have given their lives for this goal. However, those charged with
carrying out the administrative charge created by the U.N. Charter have failed
to protect both the intent of the U.N. Charter's framers and those who fird
themselves in the midst of war and chaos, and have allowed the peacekeepers
to become victimizers.
III. ALLEGATIONS, CONTRACEPTIVES, AND HIV / AIDS
The primary abuse allegations addressed in this paper are the sexual abuse
allegations made against the peacekeepers, as these represent the gravest breach
of the duty of peacekeepers and represent an utter disregard for the sanctity of
human life, particularly the lives of young girls. It is important to note,
however, that in the days prior to the writing of this paper there have been
increasing questions regarding the use of force by peacekeepers,' and whether
force is used outside of the sanctioned self-defense realm.47 This issue
highlights the need for a central military law governing peacekeepers of all
nationalities, as such a system would allow for a more immediate adjudication
of such allegations and would ensure that those peacekeepers involved would
be uniformly investigated, and either exonerated or prosecuted under the same
legal principles and terms.
(identifying that, as early as 2002, reports regarding U.N. peacekeeper abuses of young children were
surfacing to NGOs such as Save the Children in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia).
45. Cathy Majtenyi, Radio Scripts-Correspondent Report 2-315770, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS,
May 10, 2004 (explaining that the official admitted to some of these allegations in an effort to undermine
public complaints from Eritrean officials regarding peacekeeper conduct).
46. Hemisphere Briefing: Haiti: U.N. Peacekeepers Accused in Dispute, SUN-SENTINEL (FT.
LAUDERDALE, FL.), Mar. 6, 2005 (detailing Haitian government officials' allegations that peacekeepers
stationed in Haiti inappropriately fired on an unarmed crowd of pro-Aristide protesters).
47. See id.
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A Allegations Against The Peacekeepers
A young girl, out gathering coal for her family to use as they try to sustain
themselves in the middle of a war, encounters a soldier on her errand." In
seconds she goes from coal bringer to rape victim at the hands of the solider,
who cavalierly walks away from his deed.49 Worse yet, it is possible that this
girl could face reprisals from her family if she tells them of the crime. Another
young girl, roughly the same age as the first, prostitutes herself to a man in a
uniform. ° She is not a troubled teen, she is not a runaway, she is merely trying
to get an egg so that her family might have something to eat for dinner."
A young mother looks at her baby unsure of how to provide for it or how
it will be accepted in her village. The father, a man in a uniform from another
country and another race, has left and she cannot find him." Those who worked
with him refuse to help her or her baby survive, let alone find the father. 3
Another mother, just seventeen years old, looks at her child and her husband in
horror as she finds out that the soldier who attacked her gave her HIV/AIDS and
she, unknowingly, has passed the disease on to her husband and newborn
child.'
These vignettes might sound as though they are a combination of stories
from various recent wars and tortured movie plots, however in reality they are
the stories of many women who have made allegations of various types of
sexual abuse against U.N. peacekeepers in the Congo. These stories are not
uncommon, and indeed typify what the U.N. describes as the problem with
placing troops like peacekeepers in a wartime setting: social upheaval and
instability, coupled with the economic position of the peacekeepers, creates an
environment where peacekeepers can easily prey on those they should be
protecting.55
The allegations of abuse in the Congo are actually more sordid and
distasteful than the above vignettes, and implicate not only the peacekeeping
forces but also the U.N. administration sent to the conflict areas with them.56
48. Fox SPECIAL REPORT (Steve Harrigan reporting), supra note 12.
49. Id.
50. See Engstrand-Neascu, supra note 44 (noting that these acts usually take place in local hotel
rooms).
51. See id. (explaining that many young girls in the Congo were enticed into prostitution for a few
eggs, some bread, or some chocolate).
52. Fox SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 12.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Engstrand-Neascu, supra note 44.
56. See Thomas P. Kilgannon, Outside View: Peacekeepers or Predators?, UNITED PRESS
INTERNATIONAL, Feb. 15, 2005 (noting a portion of the U.N.'s Congo investigation report which blames the
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An official's computer files were screened and found to contain pornographic
images of the official with local children." The same official was caught in a
sting operation started by local authorities in which he attempted to engage in
sexual activities with a local, very underage girl. 8 He could not be prosecuted
by the local authorities, as he was deemed to fall under the peacekeeper
exception, and was not prosecuted by his home country for his crimes either.5
On the point of age, to date the youngest reported victim of abuse at the hands
of the peacekeeper was seven years old at the time of the alleged abuse.' Under
the terms of peacekeeper protocol before these allegations came to light,
peacekeepers were forbidden to have relations with anyone who was under 18
years old.6
The Congo allegations were the result of both an internal U.N. investiga-
tion62 and news exposes by U.S. news programs "20/20 's and "Fox News. ' '64
The allegations make concrete the stories of victims through these accounts,
both in news and on television, and it is easier to estimate the types of offenses
the peacekeepers are alleged to have committed. However, there have been
numerous allegations of abuse at other missions over the history of the U.N.
peacekeeping operations which are not as detailed and provide murkier waters
for lawyers looking at potential criminal charges.65 Since the Congo allegations
have surfaced, however, there has been more discussion of the past allegations
in the media, and indeed an allegation made by a Haitian woman was picked up
sexual abuses perpetrated by peacekeepers in the Congo in part on "the absence of any programs for off-duty
peacekeepers").
57. Id. (stating that a French official was implicated in an online pedophile operation).
58. Sex! Shocking Sex at the U.N.!, INVESTOR'S BusINESS DAILY, Feb. 24, 2005, at A13 (explaining
that the sting operation allowed the Congolese police access to the official's house, thus allowing them to
discover that he had taped his activities with children and that he had filmnaking equipment set up in his
bedroom).
59. See generally Kilgannon, supra note 56.
60. See Fox SPEcIAL REPORT, supra note 12.
61. See Engstrand-Neascu, supra note 44.
62. See Deen, supra note 10 (explaining that the report, created under the watch of Jordanian Prince
Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein, a Jordanian representative to the U.N., "says there is a widespread perception
that peacekeeping personnel, whether military or civilian, who commit acts of sexual exploitation and abuse
rarely if ever face disciplinary charged for such acts").
63. See Kilgannon, supra note 56 (crediting the 20/20 investigative team sent to the Congo with
uncovering many important incidents of peacekeeper misconduct).
64. See FOX SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 12.
65. See, e.g., Congress Probes UNPeacekeepers 'Misconduct in Congo, VOICE OF AMERICANEWS,
Mar. 1, 2005 (citing a top U.N. official as admitting that the allegations of peacekeeper misconduct are not
limited to the Congo mission).
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by the media in the days after the initial Congo story broke.6 While the
peacekeepers in the Haitian allegation were cleared of rape charges, 67 they were
nonetheless found to have engaged in prostitution with the woman in question,68
which constituted a breach of the peacekeeper policies and resulted in the
peacekeepers being publicly sent back to their home countries.69
B. Conflicting Messages
As stated above, the U.N. has maintained a prohibition on sexual relations
between peacekeepers and locals under the age of 18,70 and does not condone
peacekeepers engaging in prostitution." What the U.N. does condone, and
indeed accommodate, is easy access to condoms for peacekeepers,72 going so
far as to provide them with pre-filled pouches when they are being briefed for
their mission assignments.73 The official reasoning for this program is the
health and safety of the peacekeepers while they are on their assignments, using
the logic that these are typically young men, and that "[b]oys will be boys."74
The pouches are accompanied by the distribution of cards detailing how to
protect oneself from contracting HIV/AIDS;75 these cards are conveniently
printed in over 10 languages for easy understanding.76 These cards have a
twofold purpose, the education of peacekeepers and the education of those
living in the areas to which the peacekeepers are sent.77 Interestingly, despite
the attempts to educate the peacekeepers and provide them with protection, the
U.N. does not require potential peacekeepers to be screened for HIV/AIDS
before they are sent on peacekeeping missions.7" While HIV/AIDS pre-
screening is standard practice in at least the armed forces of the U.S. and U.K.,79
66. UNPeacekeepers in Haiti ClearedofRape Allegations, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, Feb.
25, 2005.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Engstrand-Neascu, supra note 44.
71. See, e.g., UN. peacekeepers in Haiti cleared, supra note 66.
72. See Kuhlmann, supra note 16. Interestingly, the peacekeepers profiled in the Kuhhnann article
are those bound for Eritrea where, as mentioned above, at least one U.N. official has recently admitted that
there were instances of sexual abuse involving peacekeepers and local girls. Id
73. Id.
74. Lynch, supra note 14.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Kuhlmann, supra note 16.
79. Id.
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it is not necessarily the standard practice in the other U.N. member countries
willing to volunteer troops as peacekeepers."0 The lack of pre-deployment
screening of peacekeepers by the U.N. is particularly disturbing when one notes
that in recent years many of the peacekeeping missions have been comprised of
troops from countries where HIV/AIDS infection rates are rising at catastrophic
rates,"1 and affecting a large portion of the population.
However well intentioned the peacekeeper pouches might be, they appear
to have limited success rates in stopping either the transmission of HIV/AIDS
to the local populations or the fathering of children with women from the local
population.12 Turning to the HIV/AIDS transmission issue, at least one study
has charted an alarming correlation between the deployment of U.N. peace-
keepers from countries with high and steadily increasing HIV/AIDS infection
rates and an increase in the rates of locals infected by HIV/AIDS after the
arrival of the peacekeepers. 3 The poignant vignette above of the new mother
discovering that she and her entire family are infected because of an act by a
U.N. peacekeeper' is a dreadful example of this trend, and sadly is not a rare
story in the Congo."5 Given the availability of both the empirical evidence and
human tragedies, the U.N. policy of voluntary HIV/AIDS testing is even more
disturbing and calls the peacekeeping administration into further question. 6
Turning to the local pregnancy issue, there are media accounts and internal
investigation data to support the conclusion that instances of U.N. peacekeepers
fathering children with local women, or girls, and then leaving without
assuming any parental role or financial responsibility are far from rare. 7 Not
only do these peacekeepers fail to take any responsibility or make any financial
accommodations for their children, the U.N. fails to do either of these as well.88
To conclude, the abuse allegations have done more than undermine the
U.N. administration and the credibility of the peacekeeping mission. These
abuses, alleged though they are at present, if true, have taken childhood from
countless young girls- and in some instances boys- and replaced it with physical
and psychological pain and torment. Many of these young victims face social
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Fox SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 12.
83. Benny Avni, Monitoring HIV in U.N. Peacekeepers, THE NEW YORK SuN, Jan. 24, 2005, at 7.
84. See Fox SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 12.
85. Id.
86. See Avni, supra note 83.
87. See Fox SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 12.
88. Id.
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ostracism both now and in the future as a result of what happened to them. 9
The women who have peacekeeper-fathered children find themselves in much
the same predicament, and are forced to struggle even more for survival after
the arrival of the peacekeepers than before the peacekeepers arrived in the
area." And those who contracted HIV/AIDS from the peacekeepers face a
myriad of consequences and problems as a result of their infection. Some, like
the young woman in the vignette, are faced with the knowledge that they and
their families are condemned to live with, and likely die from, the disease.9
Others will not know that they are ill until their health deteriorates, and could
potentially pass on the disease further. Still others will know their status and
have to try to be productive members of their society and hope that they will not
be shunned by their families and community because of the disease and the way
it was contracted, while at the same time struggling to find medical treatment
if available. None of these scenarios arise out of a quest for peace, and all that
they do is engender hatred and suffering, undermining the concept of the U.N.
in general, as well as peacekeeping, and also undermining the likelihood that
U.N. peacekeepers will be allowed in the area again should they be needed. In
no way can these abuses be seen as maintaining international peace and security,
and indeed in many ways these abuses are the same as the atrocities which were
deemed to pose a threat to peace and security occasioning the deployment of the
peacekeepers in the first place.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PEACEKEEPING
A. Current Law Affecting Peacekeepers
Just as peacekeeping missions are manned by troops from around the
world, so too is the law pertaining to peacekeepers global in its composition.
The global quality of applicable law is due to the fact that, in such instances as
peacekeeper sexual abuses or other misconduct, peacekeepers are not subject to
the laws of an international body, but rather are to be tried, if at all, in their
home countries and under the military law of their home country.92 The most
the U.N. administration can do in such a situation is to strip the peacekeeper of
89. Exploitation of Women by UN Peacekeepers in Congo Widespread, THE PRESS TRUST OF INDIA,
Jan. 8, 2005.
90. Id.
91. See Fox SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 12.
92. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic Conference
of Plenipotentiatics on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF, 183/9 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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his position and send him back to his home country.a3 Indeed, the U.N. itself
does not make it a practice to chastise the member countries which send abusive
peacekeepers because of the fear that it will lose a source of volunteer
peacekeepers if it offends the sending nation.'
Once in the home country, the peacekeeper is then subject to the military
laws of his country, which include the use of discretion in the decision of
whether to prosecute the peacekeeper.95 A problem for both the home country
in making its decision regarding prosecution and the U.N. administration in
evaluating the extensive nature of the abuses, is the local language barrier,96 as
well as the difficulty of trying a case where the victim is in a far away and
impoverished nation, and not likely to testify before a court even if she could
be brought there due to the potential familial and societal reprisals and ostracism
she could face.9"
The problem with the state of the law as it relates to peacekeepers is not
limited solely to the above, however, as there is also a grave and constant
possibility of uneven administration ofjustice against peacekeepers at the same
mission, charged with the same crimes, who are from different countries which
have different military laws or different propensities for prosecuting
peacekeepers. 9' An example from the current Congolese abuse allegations is the
difference between the fate of a French peacekeeper implicated in the abuse who
went to trial in France when he was returned," and two South African
peacekeepers who are still being held, but who have not been tried." ° In
addition, different national legal systems have different concepts of pre-trial
rights and procedure, due process and fair trials, and jury use, leading to
different outcomes for the same crime.' The author would argue that, to those
93. See Linton, supra note 7.
94. Id.
95. Following the initial U.N. investigation of the Congo mission, it repatriated three men: a French
support staff member and two Moroccan peacekeepers. Turner, supra note 8. Due to the differences in law
and public policy between the two countries, however, only the Frenchman was put on trial. Id.
96. The multi-national quality of the peacekeeping missions, as well as the destitution of many areas
where peacekeepers are stationed and the very real possibility that the victimized children have not been able
to attend school and learn a common language with the peacekeepers due to the hostilities in their country can
easily lead to a language issue.
97. See, e.g., Editorial: Peacekeepers as Abusers, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS, Dec. 24, 2004
(providing, as an example, a twelve year old Congolese girl who is reluctant to tell ever her family what
happened to her at the hands of a peacekeeper, stating "I didn't tell my mother because she would beat me.").
98. See generally KNOOPs, supra note 3 (explaining the applicability of current law to U.N.
peacekeepers).
99. See 'Exploitation of Women by U.N. Peacekeepers in Congo Widespread, 'supra note 119.
100. Id.
101. See WtLIM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
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who created and ran the Nuremburg trials as a model of international criminal
law, this very fact would be offensive.
Additionally, as soldiers in the national army of their home country prior
to their peacekeeping assignment, there is a very strong likelihood that
peacekeepers are familiar with the crimes and punishments used in their military
courts. The author further submits that this is dangerous in that a peacekeeper
from a home country with a nascent military and military law, or one who
knows that sentences for sexual abuses are relatively light, or one who knows
that there is a precedent of not prosecuting errant peacekeepers, will take
comfort in that knowledge and feel less inhibited in his abuses, safe in the
knowledge that he will not face serious charges at home. If nothing else, this
undermines international peace and security in already troubled areas, and
presents the very prescient threat that the local population will be victimized by
a peacekeeper with such knowledge.
B. Problems With Extending the ICC Statute to Peacekeepers
The creation of the current ICC statute has codified many of the serious
and yet esoteric crimes created at Nuremberg, such as war crimes and crimes
against humanity." 2 By providing lawyers and litigants with actual definitions
of these crimes, including elements, the ICC statute has both clarified the state
of international crimes on a grand scale and made the ability to prosecute
peacekeepers for abuses essentially non-existent.' 3 Doubtless there will be calls
to subject U.N. peacekeepers to the jurisdiction of the ICC for abuses and do
away with the home country military law rule currently in place. However, a
closer look at the ICC statute reveals that there is a very small likelihood of
successful prosecution of individual peacekeepers under the statute." Further,
should a loophole be found, or should the statute be amended to allow for
individual prosecutions of peacekeeper abuses, the structure of the ICC
procedures' 5 is such that the ICC is not the proper place to try the peacekeepers.
71-137 (2001) (explaining the many substantive and procedural differences in trial rights which had to be
reconciled between member states in drafting an ICC statute which the majority could agree on).
102. See generally PERSICO, supra note 27 (describing the criminal charges brought against the Nazi
regime by the Nuremberg prosecutorial staff).
103. See Rome Statute, supra note 92, pt. 2 (defining the crimes which the ICC has the jurisdiction
to prosecute).
104. Id. (providing for individual prosecution of crimes which are part of a concerted effort or plan,
rather than those which are indiscriminately carried out for personal gratification or other non-concerted
reasons).
105. Id. pts. 4-8. (providing the framework of the court apparatus, pre-trial procedure, trial procedure,
and appellate rights and procedures).
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As a threshold issue, it is very true that both war crimes and crimes against
humanity under the ICC include sexual crimes and abuses such as rape.0 6 This
is certainly a laudable and appropriate provision, as sexual crimes and abuses
are a sad and disturbing part of conflicts past and present; the problem is that as
much as these provisions are a prosecutorial resource for such political actors
and their underlings who have devised, ordered, and committed such grave
crimes as those set forth in the ICC statute, these are not generally applicable to
the peacekeepers based on the facts available at the present time. The problem
with these provisions is that they require, if not a specific mens rea, at the very
least that the actions be part of a larger plan targeted to the population in general
rather than individuals in it.107 This is more akin to a RICO conspiracy charge
under U.S. law,10' with the caveat that those being prosecuted all need the same
mens rea and knowledge predicate of targeting a certain population for harm
and destruction. 09
Under such a provision, in order to be prosecuted, peacekeepers would
have to be found to have been part of a concerted and organized effort to rape
or otherwise sexually abuse the local population with the goal of harming the
population as a whole." 0 However widespread the abuses are, it is highly
unlikely that there was a specific U.N. protocol or plan to perpetrate sexual
abuses on the local populations of the mission areas; it is also improbable that
there was a specific plan in place at the mission level by U.N. staffers and
administrators to do the same thing. The ICC statute is written in such a way
that it would appear to turn a blind eye to the abuses because it provides no
basis for prosecution ofpeacekeepers for war crimes or crimes against humanity
unless the abuses were committed as an overall part of a plan to target the local
106. Id. pt. 2, art. 8 (b)(xxii) (defining a qualifying offense for a war crime charge as "[c]omitting
rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,. . . enforced sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Convention."); Id. pt. 2, art 7 (g) (defining a
qualifying offense for a crime against humanity charge as "[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.").
107. Id. pt. 2, art. 8 (b) (requiring that a war crime charge occur in a situation of international or, in
certain circumstances, national conflicts in which international law provisions and expectations apply); Id.
pt. 2, art. 7 (limiting the application of the crimes against humanity charge to situations where "any of the
following acts [including sexual violence]... [are] committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack").
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (2000). In contrast with the ICC mens rea and knowledge
requirements, a person can be charged under RICO for acting in concert with others towards an illegal goal
even if the knowledge of the goal and the other participants is not within the person's possession. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c).
109. Cf. id.; Rome Statute, supra note 92, pt. 2, arts. 7, 8.
110. Rome Statute, supra note 122, pt. 2 arts. 7, 8 (providing the mens rea and concerted action
requirements, as well as the elements which comprise various crimes of sexual violence under the ICC
statute).
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population for abuse,"' and it would appear unlikely that any of the U.N
administrators, commanders, or staffers could be prosecuted for the same
reasons. "12
Assuming that there is a way to read the ICC statute to allow the
prosecution of U.N. peacekeepers individually for sexual abuses, or that the
statute was amended to give the ICC prosecutorial jurisdiction over these cases,
there are still several critical procedural flaws in the statute. First, not all U.N.
member states are signatories of the ICC statute, and thus there would be an
unequal prosecution of peacekeepers, akin to the current situation, if the ICC
were used as a venue only for those peacekeepers whose home countries were
ICC signatories."' Second, given the way that the ICC statute is written and
construed, the primary power of the court in getting a case to trial lies with the
Prosecutor, who has much more power than his prosecutorial counterparts in
many other countries, including U.S. civilian and military courts."4 Such a
prosecutorial structure creates a situation which is ripe for over-discretion by the
Prosecutor, and is even more dangerous when one considers that the Prosecutor
can be from any country, including the home country of the peacekeeper." 5
Third, as mentioned in the above section, the ability to have victims, or
eyewitnesses, come forward to testify is hampered by the language, distance,
and social gap." 6 A corollary to that is that, unlike some adjudicative bodies
such as the U.S. military courts,"' the ICC statute does not grant the ICC the
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Rome Statute, supra note 92; UNITED NATIONS, RATIFICATION STATUS OF THE ROME
STATUTE (providing a list of countries which have and have not ratified the ICC statute), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/engishinternetbible/partL/chapterXVlItreatyl.asp (last visited Apr.
22, 2005) (hereinafter RATIFICATION STATUS OF THE ROME STATUTE).
114. Rome Statute, supra note 122, pt. 2, art. 15 (allowing the Prosecutor ultimate discretion over
which cases to bring to the Pre-Trial Chamber). Also, as the Pre-Trial Chamber is implicated in the
prosecutorial decisions made, the allowance that the Prosecutor can still receive information a case which the
Pre-Trial Chamber has said it cannot officially investigate (which can be argued to be a quasi-investigation
in the first place), can be seen to implicate double jeopardy. Id. The double jeopardy implication can be seen
to arise from the fact that the Pre-Trial Chamber is composed solely ofjudges, which lends an official judicial
element to an opinion issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber which is not of the same low-level implication as
judges deciding whether to grant arrest warrants. Id. at pt. 4, art. 39.
115. The qualifications for election to the Office of Prosecutor are set forth in the ICC statute, as are
prohibitions against certain activities on the part of the Prosecutor and his staff. Id. at pt. 4, art. 42. While
there are provisions requiring the recusal of the Prosecutor in certain cases, these provisions address current
and past conflicts, including whether the Prosecutor had dealings with the same case or parties in another
court, but are silent on shared nationality, ethnicity, or religion as a disqualifying factor. Id.
116. See supra Part lL.
117. 10 U.S.C. § 847 (2000) (granting U.S. military courts subpoena power and making the failure
or refusal to appear in court pursuant to subpoena or other method of requiring personal presence in court "an
offense against the United States").
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ability to subpoena or otherwise compel witnesses to testify before the court."'
While the image of forcing a young victim in front of a foreign court is not
particularly attractive, the inability to compel the presence and testimony of
witnesses, aide workers, other U.N. officials, and peacekeepers, or those who
might have learned of the abuses through pictures or other descriptions, is a flaw
to any prosecution and turns the prosecution into a he-said/she-said battle. Add
to this the possible inability of young victims to positively identify their attacker
beyond a reasonable doubt, and peacekeeper prosecutions at the ICC seem
doomed to an uncertain, and inequitable, outcome under the procedural
requirements set forth in the ICC statute regardless of their viability under the
terms of the current crimes and elements codified in the ICC statute.
Ultimately, the ICC is not the proper jurisdiction for prosecution of
peacekeepers on abuse charges of any type, and particularly sexual abuses. The
ICC statute was created to codify the tradition of prosecuting those accused of
political and military-political atrocities which started with the prosecutions at
Nuremberg and evolved from that point." 9 It was not created to try individuals
for their separate crimes, apart from their complicity in a larger plan to harm or
destroy a population."0 Also, it is the author's belief that the ICC was intended
to be used as a body for prosecution of internationally condemned ideas and
beliefs, such as those which emerged from the conflicts in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, as reflected in the crimes and criminal elements codified in the ICC
statute.' If this is true, then the prosecution of U.N. peacekeepers at the ICC
would be inappropriate because the ideas and beliefs espoused by the U.N. vis
a vis peacekeeping as a whole are not likely to be viewed as morally or legally
reprehensible, and thus are not within the realm of the intent to try a system, or
organization, as well as the individual members of it.
118. The ICC statute requires that requests for persons, documents, and other information go through
the member state. Rome Statute, supra note 122, pt. 9. There are several problems with this. First, if the
accused is a resident of a non-signatory state to the ICC statute, or the pertinent information is located in a
non-signatory state, the ICC statute would not appear to have any force or effect to bring the person or thing
before the court. Id. Second, although the statute repeatedly mentions that the member state "shall" cooperate
with requests for the extradition of people and production of documents, there is no penalty provision for
failing to comply or withholding information from the ICC. Id. Third, and most important for the purposes
of this paper, is the fact that NGOs, such as the U.N. and therefore U.N. peacekeepers acting in that capacity,
are not signatories to the ICC statute. See RATIFICATION STATUS OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 113. This
would mean that, unless the ICC statute were to be amended or revised, the ICC could not ask the U.N. to
produce persons, documents, or other information; if the ICC did make such a request, there would be no
requirement that the U.N. comply. Id.
119. See SCHARF, supra note 2, at 771-847 (describing the motivating factors which led to the
creation and implementation of the ICC statute and the ICC).
120. Rome Statute, supra note 92, pt. 2, arts. 7, 8.
121. Id.
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V. THE USCMJ As APPLIED TO ALLEGED PEACEKEEPER OFFENSES
In contrast to the above description of the ICC statute and jurisdiction,
were any implicated peacekeepers to be Americans (at present this is not the
case), they would be subject to a well defined and precise trial, both in the
elements of the crime itself and the trial and prosecution.1
22
Unlike the ICC, U.S. military courts function to prosecute military
personnel in all manner of crimes, from those relating to their commands or
actions while on duty2 . to criminal acts involving non-military personnel.'24
The system functions to separate military personnel from standard civilian
justice and govern them according to traditional laws regarding combat
situations and situations in which U.S. personnel who are currently serving in
the armed forces find themselves.'25 The prosecution of a soldier for acts
amounting to war crimes is not an indictment of the U.S. military, its ideas and
goals, but rather of the individual, or, in some occasions of a chain of
command. 1
26
In terms of prosecuting the alleged sexual abuses by peacekeepers, the
USCMJ would allow individual prosecution of soldiers for child abuse,'27
cruelty and maltreatment, 128 rape,129 sodomy, 30 conduct unbecoming of an
122. See generally 10 U.S.C § 101 etseq. (2000) (providing the text of military law and the USCMJ).
123. Id. § 801 et seq. (codifying the USCMJ, which applies to duty-related violations and conduct
as well as soldiers' activities when they are not on duty but are still enlisted in U.S. military service).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 802 (enumerating the many classes of persons subject to the USCMJ, including active duty
officers and military personnel, reservists, cadets and others training to be officers, retired military personnel
still receiving some kind of compensation or hospitalization treatment from the U.S. military, those
incarcerated after a previous court-martial, staffers of various government agencies and organizations who
are working in conjunction with the military, prisoners of war, persons from political entities other than the
U.S. who are assigned to U.S. military units abroad (unless these persons are exempted by treaty), to name
just a few)).
126. See generally id. § 801 etseq. (providing the crimes under which persons subject to the USCMJ
can be charged, as well as the elements necessary for a conviction on these crimes).
127. Id. § 843 (detailing a "child abuse offense" under the USCMJ as "an act that involves sexual or
physical abuse of a person who has not attained the age of 16 years and constitutes" rape, sodomy, aggravated
assault, "indecent assault, assault with intent to commit murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, or indecent acts
or liberties with a child).
128. Id. § 893 ("Any person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty toward, or oppression or
maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."). The terms
of this statute could be applied to peacekeepers on the theory that those in the affected areas to which the
peacekeepers have been dispatched are "subject to [their] orders" both because of the need for the locals to
cooperate with the peacekeepers to obtain services and protection from the U.N. and because of the ability of
the peacekeepers to use force against those who do not follow their orders and are seen as posing a threat to
the peacekeepers and the peace in general.
129. 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2000). The definition of rape provided under the statute is very broad, and the
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officer and a gentleman (a crime which could be applied to the abandonment of
children fathered in the course of peacekeeping), 3 ' and sexual harassment. 3
All of these charges are made against the individual,'33 and the USCMJ also
provides the basis for an accessory after the fact prosecution should it be alleged
that a member of the peacekeeping staff became aware of the abuse after it was
committed and yet did nothing to report it or otherwise stop such abuses from
happening.'34 In this way, the USCMJ would allow for fair prosecution of the
individual, and hold the rest of the mission accountable for knowledge of abuses
after the fact, while not in any way indicting (whether in fact or implication) the
mission and idea of the U.S. military as a whole or, by extension, the
peacekeeping mission as a whole if applied in that context.
Turning to the more procedural aspects as the USCMJ, the accused has the
knowledge that the prosecuting officer is a member of the military as well, and
does not have the same all-encompassing powers as an ICC Prosecutor. 35
Additionally, the USCMJ does not require judicial approval of an investigation
affirmative defense provided in the statute-mistake as to the age of the victim-would not apply to the
peacekeeping allegations in the Congo because there is a reasonability requirement for the belief that the
woman involved was of legal age. Id. Given the very young age of the accusers, it is highly unlikely that such
a defense would be feasible or successful in a court-martial.
130. Id. § 925. Again, this is a very broad statute in terms of the definition of the crime and the
degree to which the act must have been carried out before a charge can be brought. Id.
131. Id. § 933 ("Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct
unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.").
132. Id. § 1561 (2000). This statute is interesting for the purposes of the peacekeeper discussion for
two reasons. First, the definition of sexual harassment, while limited to the workplace, could be applied to
any local women who might have been employed by or in the peacekeeping mission. Id. Second, this statute
is equally applicable to military personnel and civilians alike, thus providing double protection for any local
women (or indeed any peacekeeping officials or other personnel) against unwanted attention and advances.
Id.
133. See id. §§ 843, 920, 925, 933, 1561. The only exception to this is a provision in 10 U.S.C. §
1561, the sexual harassment statute, which makes the commanding officer or supervisor guilty of a crime if
sexual harassment reports are not investigated or ignored, or such behavior is exhibited in front of the
commanding officer or supervisor and no action is taken. Id. § 1561. However, the statute does specify the
method in which complaints against an individual are to be handled, and makes it clear that sexual harassment
is a crime under the USCMJ that is punishable by court-martial. Id.
134. Id. § 878 ("Any person subject to this chapter who, knowing that an offense punishable by this
chapter has been committed, receives, comforts, or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his
apprehension, trial, or punishment shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.").
135. 10 U.S.C. §§ 830-835 (2000) (providing the requirements ofpre-trial procedure in cases which
are subject to the jurisdiction of a court-martial).
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before it occurs, 36 as is the case with the ICC statutory provisions. 37 The
accused also is given the right to counsel who is also a military officer and is
versed in the laws of the military itself.3 ' In terms of witness production, the
USCMJ specifically allows the military courts to legally require witnesses to
appear before the court and testify, 39 under threat of prosecution if they do not
in fact appear."4
The USCMJ and military courts have a long history due to their age and
continued use throughout U.S. history, and a concise history of cases illustrating
the above points is not within the scope of this paper. However, it is important
to note such a history, as it allows prosecution for acts such as the alleged
peacekeeper abuses, and thus provides both the prosecution and the defense in
such a situation with guideposts for trial and appeals, as well as with a standard
body of law which can be relied on and which is not in flux due to the volatile
nature of the subject matter and political climate, as could be the case with the
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VI. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE PEACEKEEPING APPARATUS
The current abuse allegations against U.N. peacekeepers in the Congo
present two interrelated yet distinct situations which need to be addressed in
order to assure that there is justice for the unwilling victims of abuse and a
legitimate and respected body to assist in peacekeeping activities in the future.
Each of these situations will be addressed separately.
A. Short Term Changes and Solutions
The short term goal of the UNSC, particularly the permanent members who
gave rise to the U.N. in the beginning, must be to provide the victims of abuse
with counseling and medical assistance, as well as the promise that there will be
justice for them. These steps are not only humanitarian gestures, they are
136. Id. Under the USCMJ, a full investigation must be made into the allegations prior to any
proceeding in front of a military judge. Id. In fact, before a trial can be ordered the investigatory body must
clear the charges and the results of the investigation with a staff judge advocate. Id. § 834.
137. See supra Part IV B.
138. 10 U.S.C. § 832 ("The accused shall be advised of the charges against him and of his right to
be represented at that investigation [where the determination of whether to proceed with a formal charge and
court-martial request is made] by counsel.").
139. Id. § 846 ("Process issued in court-martial cases to compel witnesses to appear and testify and
to compel the production of other evidence shall be similar to that which courts of the United States having
criminal jurisdiction may lawfully issue.").
140. See id. § 847 (making it a violation of the USCMJ to fail to appear or produce evidence when
the court-martial or other military court has subpoenaed the witness or the evidence).
141. Seesupra Part IV B.
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indeed necessary to preserve some semblance of credibility for the
peacekeeping concept and the U.N. as a larger entity.
The provision of counseling and medical assistance to victims is a weighty
task given the fear and reluctance of victims, especially children, to come
forward, and should be the task of trained child psychologists and other mental
health professionals with documented experience. The author suspects that the
best candidates for this job would be female doctors, as the trauma of seeing
male doctors who remind the victims of their attackers could be
counterproductive to the attempted medical assistance. Counseling and medical
assistance must also be made available to the families of the victims so they can
understand the trauma suffered by their family member, and, where appropriate,
receive medical assistance and treatment themselves. Further, the peacekeepers
who fathered children with local women must be found, if possible, through
such measures as mandatory DNA tests, and made to take care of their children
and the women with whom they fathered children. If identification is not
possible, lifetime care for these women and children should be provided by the
U.N. itself. The author proposes that the counseling, medical treatment, and
palimony be funded by the nations which contributed abusive peacekeepers.
It is clear from the evidence that, while the U.N. investigation of the
alleged abuses was being conducted, further abuses were being committed by
peacekeepers in the very areas under investigation.'42 Not only does this evince
both questionable judgment and a sense of being above the law on the part of
the abusive peacekeepers and members of the mission administration, it also
implicates the faith one can have in reformation of peacekeeping missions with-
out some additional oversight. Therefore, the permanent members of the
UNSC, or at least two of these members, should send envoys from their own
military corps to oversee the conduct of the peacekeepers, as well as the creation
of secured missions where the comings and goings of the peacekeepers would
be heavily monitored. Evidence from victims indicates that a frequent method
of enticing women and children to prostitute themselves was with the promise
of obtaining payment in food, which they would use to feed their starving
families. 43 With this in mind, the peacekeepers should not be allowed to have
access to excess food or other supplies, and access to facilities where food and
other commodities are stored must be under heavy surveillance at all times.
Legally, the home countries of abusive peacekeepers must actively
prosecute the peacekeepers, and the U.N. must repatriate these peacekeepers to
their home countries so that the prosecutions can start. Although the victims
will still be forced to deal with uneven justice based on the nationality of their
abusers, they must still be given the fullest possible justice allowed under the
142. UN. Peacekeepers Abused Women, Claims Watchdog, MORNING STAR [U.K.], Jan. 8,2005.
143. See supra Part ll A.
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legal system of their abuser. To that end, it is imperative that the U.N. release
to the public at large the identities of the home countries of the abusers, and put
pressure on these countries to vigorously prosecute the abusive peacekeepers.
Indeed, these countries should be subject to economic sanctions and removed
from eligibility to send any further peacekeepers (as well as forced to recall all
current peacekeepers) should they fail to prosecute the abusers to the fullest
extent allowed under their legal systems. While this might sound excessive,
countries which are heavily dependent on the U.N. and its subsidiary agencies
for commercial, infrastructural, humanitarian, and other aide are not likely to
ignore the threat of a sanction, regardless of their past precedents in prosecuting
allegedly abusive peacekeepers.
To say that these suggestions are anything more than remedial and stop-
gap measures would be clearly erroneous, however in the short-term, such
measures are a good option because they validate the rights of the victims and
the ideal of the preservation of peace and the importance of humanitarian
actions and policies upon which the U.N., and later the U.N. peacekeeping
missions, was founded.
B. Long Term Apparatus Changes
Peacekeeping missions in the abstract are a vital expression of the ideas
and goals of the U.N., and the humanitarianism of its members. The key to the
future of peacekeeping missions is to re-examine the original provisions of the
U.N. Charter before the peacekeeping mandate was inferred into the Chapter VI
provisions.' In so doing, the theme of a separate military force under the joint
command, and ultimate control, of the UNSC emerges as the intent of the
framers of the Charter.'45 Certainly it seems unlikely that a separate U.N.
military would come to fruition as the fighting force of its member states,
especially when these member states are frequently those going to war with
each other and/or committing humanitarian atrocities against groups of
people.'46 However, it is the author's position that if the concepts of the Charter
were combined with the inference of a peacekeeping force, there would be a
peacekeeping apparatus which would be effective, structured, and able to punish
and prevent abuses like those seen in the Congo.
By creating a joint command premised on the Joint Chiefs of Staff model
used by the U.S. military, there would be a greater deal of accountability and
coordination between the mission commands. Under this structure, member
144. See supra Part I.
145. Id.
146. For example, Iraq was, and still is, a member state of the U.N. Even were there to be general
consensus regarding the need for force, the possibility of having such a force take action against the member
state could easily become fractious.
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states would not volunteer their soldiers for peacekeeping duty, rather the U.N.
military force would actively recruit both interested civilians and current
military personnel from around the globe to join the force. This would require
that the recruits forsake the laws of their home country, whatever it might be,
and agree to be subject to the jurisdiction of the military court for the force, thus
solving the uneven justice problem and preventing the possibility of legally
savvy peacekeepers being more likely to commit abuses knowing that they will
not face severe punishments in their home country's military court.
In terms of the military law used, as between the laws of the permanent
members of the UNSC the most similar legal systems are those of the U.S. and
the U.K., and accordingly, for stability and ease of adapting these laws to the
force, those should be used as the code for the U.N. military force. This would
reconcile the issues with the current legal status of peacekeepers and the
application of the ICC statute to U.N. peacekeepers with the guaranteed
prosecutorial abilities and procedural benefits found in the USCMJ.'47 By
adopting laws which have cases establishing precedent, the lawyers involved in
the prosecutions on both sides would have a better knowledge and
understanding of how to argue their cases, and judges would have a far better
understanding of how to apply statutory law.
Along with the U.N. military force there would have to be a recruitment
and screening process for all civilian staff members, and an office specifically
for the oversight of peacekeeper activities and interaction with the local popula-
tions must be created and well staffed. This office should be charged with,
among other things, educating the local community about the proper and
improper actions of peacekeepers, and how and where they should report any
instances of inappropriate conduct by the peacekeepers. All of these sugges-
tions would rather obviously require funding, which the author submits should
not go directly through the U.N., especially in the wake of the oil-for-food
scandal.148 Rather, the permanent UNSC members alone should fund the U.N.
military force with contributions which are commensurate to their contributions
as of 2005. As a corollary, the contributions of each of the permanent UNSC
members would then be significantly reduced to accommodate the funding of
the peacekeeping operation. Since one of the primary tasks assigned to the
permanent UNSC members is the maintenance of "international peace and
security," and since this task requires a robust peacekeeping and military force,
the permanent members' first financial responsibility should be the creation and
147. See supra Part V.
148. See Phil Hirschkorn, Texas Businessman Indicted in U.N. Oil-For-Food Probe, CNN.cOM, Apr.
15, 2005, available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/04/14/oilfood.indictment/index.html (last visited Apr.
22, 2005).
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maintenance of an organized, legally accountable, and morally respected U.N.
military force.
In terms of the troops themselves, recruits must be carefully screened and
vetted before they are allowed to become peacekeepers. Key among the
screening processes must be the mandatory taking of an HIV/AIDS test before
and during deployment. In the event that any fathering issues should arise,
pictures of the peacekeepers must be maintained on file, and all deployed peace-
keepers and accompanying personnel must be required to give a DNA sample
prior to deployment. Should any peacekeeper alter his appearance while
deployed or prior to deployment, he should be required to resubmit a photo-
graph. These measures do tend to go into some of the private realm which civil
libertarians, especially in America, tend to hold dear, however, in order to
rehabilitate the peacekeeping idea and ensure that it can exist in a functional and
helpful way, these steps must be taken. The world, and particularly the victims,
must be assured that such allegations of abuse by peacekeepers do not occur
again.
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, the concept of a U.N. peacekeeping force evolved from a
somewhat questionable interpretation of the U.N. Charter to both win the Nobel
Peace Prize and to become known for truly abominable sexual abuses of those
it was charged with protecting. This dichotomy has been in no way helped by
the uneven legal fates which await abusive peacekeepers when they return to
their home countries. The idea of using the ICC to prosecute these errant peace-
keepers does not provide the victims with a real chance at having substantive
charges brought against the peacekeeper who abused her, and does not provide
either the prosecution or the defense adequate procedural and fairness safe-
guards before and during the trial. In contrast to these substantive and proce-
dural issues with using the ICC statute stands the USCMJ-a well-established
legal system that would allow for prosecution of peacekeepers as individuals
and contains crimes which fit those allegedly committed by the peacekeepers,
while guaranteeing procedural adequacy and fairness to the prosecution and the
defense in a less politically charged atmosphere than the ICC. The USCMJ
does not investigate or prosecute the ideas of the institution which created and
deployed the peacekeepers, rather it investigates and prosecutes those peace-
keepers who have violated the law. In so doing, the individual is brought to
justice, while the institution itself can point to the prosecution of an errant
member as evidence that it too condemns the act and that the act is not a part of
the value set and goals advanced by the institution. This protects the contribu-
tions of those members of the institution who truly believe in its goals and have
fought and sacrificed for the institution, at the same time that it protects future
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local populations from facing the prospect of allowing in potential predators or
not electing to allow in peacekeepers who might otherwise save their society.
The suggestions made in this paper aim to reconcile the two elements
present in international peacekeeping missions, especially where there are
problems within the mission: humanitarianism and law. One can have humani-
tarianism and no law and generate a system much like the current U.N.
peacekeeping system, which is besmirched by the horrid allegations of abuse
made against peacekeepers, and leaves a legacy of uneven justice for victims.
One can have law and no humanitarianism and end up with a dusty book of
statutes sitting in a library, an ancient relic never used because there was never
sufficient societal interest in the concept to create a peacekeeping force to
govern. Or, one can combine the two and have a system that benefits humanity
not only through its acts but also through its assurances of even and fair justice.
That is the combination which will allow the idea of international peacekeeping
to flourish.
